Cyberattacks do not just affect data, email systems or office IT. In manufacturing, they can have a direct impact on machinery, plant and processes, leading to consequences such as production downtime, quality issues, delivery delays or safety risks. OT security therefore protects not only information, but the industrial value chain itself. This blog post takes a closer look at the strategic importance of OT security.

When cyber attacks hit real-world production

When it comes to cybersecurity, many people first think of stolen data, encrypted laptops, compromised email inboxes or inaccessible business applications. These are serious risks. In production, however, an additional dimension arises: when digital systems control physical processes, a cyber attack can have a direct impact on machinery, plant, quality, delivery capability and, in extreme cases, on human safety.

This is precisely where OT security comes in. It deals with the protection of Operational Technology – that is, the technical systems that monitor, control and directly influence production processes.

In traditional IT environments, the focus is often on protecting data and information systems. In OT environments, the additional priority is the secure and continuous control of the physical world. An attack there is not merely a digital event; it can disrupt the operations of entire plants.

This distinction is crucial because production environments are now more interconnected than ever before. This increases the transparency and efficiency of manufacturing, but at the same time, the attack surface also grows. What used to run in isolation on the shop floor is now often connected to IT systems, suppliers, cloud services or external maintenance partners.

What does Operational Technology (OT) mean – and why do different priorities apply compared to IT?

Operational Technology refers to hardware and software that directly monitors or controls physical processes. This includes, for example, control systems such as PLCs, SCADA systems, control stations, Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES), sensors, actuators, robots, production plant and industrial networks. Whilst traditional IT primarily processes data and provides digital support for business processes, OT has a direct impact on real-world operations. A control system starts a process, a sensor provides measurement values, an actuator moves a component, and a control system monitors production parameters. This proximity to physical production makes OT particularly sensitive. An error in an office process can be inconvenient and costly. An error in a production control system, on the other hand, can result in scrap, damage equipment, endanger staff or impair a company’s ability to deliver. OT security must therefore always take into account operational safety, process stability and production continuity, in addition to protection against cyber risks.

Although IT and OT now use some similar technologies – such as networks, servers, operating systems, user accounts, interfaces and databases – they prioritise protection differently. In traditional IT, the so-called CIA triad is frequently used: Confidentiality before Integrity before Availability. Put simply, the focus is first on protecting information from unauthorised access, followed by its accuracy, and then the availability of systems and data. In OT, this prioritisation is effectively reversed: here, the focus is on AIC – Availability, Integrity and only then Confidentiality. The key consideration is, first and foremost, that plant, control systems and production processes remain secure and continuously available, as this is what drives value creation. Next comes the integrity of process and control data, because incorrect values can directly affect quality, plant condition or safety. Confidentiality remains important, but in day-to-day production operations it often does not carry the same priority as availability and process stability.

This prioritisation has practical consequences. In IT, a security update can usually be deployed at relatively short notice if it closes a critical vulnerability. In production, however, the same update can cause a validation issue, plant downtime or a disruption to the production schedule. Changes to OT systems are therefore often only possible during maintenance windows, following tests, or with the involvement of plant manufacturers.

These update hurdles are further exacerbated by the specific lifecycles of OT systems. Production plant, control systems or process control systems are often not designed to last just a few years, but remain in use for 10, 20 or even 30 years. Many of these systems were developed at a time when networking, remote maintenance, cloud connections and today’s cyber threats did not yet play a comparable role. Consequently, modern protection mechanisms such as end-to-end authentication, centralised rights management, regular security patches, secure protocols or ‘security by design’ were often not part of the original system design. An update is therefore rarely just a routine technical task. It must be coordinated with plant availability, production planning, manufacturer approvals, validation, spare parts availability and potential impacts on quality or process parameters. It is precisely this that gives rise to historically evolved structures in which availability has been consistently prioritised, but where retrofitting security measures is significantly more challenging.

OT security must therefore not be understood as a mere copy of traditional IT security. It must take into account the operational realities of production: shift work, delivery deadlines, process stability, plant availability, quality assurance, regulatory requirements and collaboration with machine manufacturers, integrators and service partners. It is precisely this combination that makes the topic challenging and strategically relevant.

Why OT security is strategically relevant

The strategic relevance of OT security stems from the potential for damage. In manufacturing companies, value creation depends directly on plant availability, stable processes and the production of goods to a defined standard of quality. If this chain is interrupted, it results not only in IT costs but also in operational and financial losses: production downtime, delayed deliveries, scrap, rework, reputational damage, contractual penalties and additional costs associated with restarting operations.

A critical point here is that attacks do not always have to target machines directly. Often, an incident in the IT system is sufficient to indirectly disrupt production. If planning data, production orders, user directories, file servers, maintenance access or communication systems fail, manufacturing can also come to a standstill. The boundary between IT and OT has become increasingly permeable in modern production environments. This increases efficiency, but also creates dependencies.

OT security is therefore not a specialist topic for individual technicians alone. It concerns production management, plant management, IT, information security, maintenance, engineering, procurement and senior management. Anyone who views OT security merely as a technical protective measure underestimates its core business significance: it is about safeguarding industrial performance.

What are the typical threats?

The threat landscape in OT cannot be reduced to a single type of attack. However, three motives are particularly relevant: sabotage, extortion and industrial espionage.

Sabotage involves disrupting production processes, tampering with equipment or deliberately interrupting operations. This may be politically, economically or criminally motivated. In OT, sabotage is particularly critical because tampering not only alters digital data but can also trigger physical effects and lead to the consequences described earlier (production downtime, scrap, etc.).

Extortion is a second key motive. Ransomware attacks, for example, aim to encrypt systems, block business operations or threaten to publish data. In manufacturing companies, the leverage is particularly high because a production stoppage quickly incurs high costs. Even if the machines are not directly compromised, due to increasing interconnectivity and the resulting interdependencies, an attack on adjacent IT systems may be sufficient to disrupt production planning, order processing or logistics.

Industrial espionage is the third motive. Manufacturing companies possess valuable know-how: formulations, process parameters, design data, quality information, manufacturing procedures or production metrics. This information is often consolidated in production via OT. If this information is intercepted, it results in strategic damage that is not always immediately apparent. The loss of process knowledge can weaken competitive positions, jeopardise product innovations or lead to long-term losses of market share.

The attack vectors are diverse. Typical entry points include unpatched systems, open ports, default passwords, insecure remote maintenance access, phishing, USB storage devices, poorly segmented networks, unclear responsibilities, unknown assets or inadequately controlled external access. A particularly critical factor is that many of these risks do not occur in isolation. It is often the combination that proves dangerous: an unknown system, outdated software, overly broad remote access and a lack of monitoring.

One example is phishing: a spear-phishing email first compromises a user account within the IT environment. From there, attackers move on, searching for privileged access, remote maintenance connections or file shares relating to production. If IT and OT networks are inadequately segmented, what was originally a classic IT incident can spread to production. This demonstrates that OT security does not begin at the machine itself, but at all the connections through which machines, people, systems and service providers interact.

What real-world cases show

Well-known security incidents show that the impact of cyber-attacks in industrial contexts can extend far beyond IT. Production downtime, manual workarounds, delayed order processing and high recovery costs are typical consequences. It is particularly instructive that damage is not only caused by the direct manipulation of a machine. In some cases, systems are shut down as a precaution, networks are disconnected or processes are halted to prevent further spread. Consequently, protective measures can themselves lead to production interruptions in an emergency. If a company does not know exactly which systems are affected, which connections exist and which plant can continue to operate safely, a widespread shutdown is often the only option. This is precisely why transparency, segmentation and prepared emergency procedures are crucial. They enable nuanced decisions rather than blanket shutdowns.

From a management perspective, the most important insight is this: OT security does not merely reduce technical risks. It enables organisations to take effective action in the event of a crisis. Companies that understand their production environment, isolate critical areas, test restart plans and control access can react more quickly and limit damage. Companies lacking these fundamentals, on the other hand, often react in a state of uncertainty – and uncertainty prolongs downtime.

Conclusion: OT security protects value creation

OT security is the answer to a changing industrial reality. Today’s production is digitally networked, data-driven and dependent on integrated systems. This development creates efficiency and transparency, but at the same time increases vulnerability. Those who take OT security seriously therefore protect not only individual control systems or networks, but a company’s ability to produce reliably.

The key difference from traditional IT security lies in the physical impact. In OT, cyber risks can lead to production stoppages, quality issues, damage to plant or risks to people. It follows that OT security must be embedded within corporate governance. It is a shared concern for IT, production, engineering, maintenance and management.

Furthermore, OT security is becoming significantly more relevant due to current regulatory developments. With NIS2, cybersecurity requirements in Europe are being extended to cover a much wider range of companies and sectors; affected organisations must, amongst other things, implement risk management measures, report security incidents and document their measures in a transparent manner. For industrial companies, this means that OT security is shifting from being a voluntary protective measure to becoming a governance and compliance task. At the same time, regulations such as the Cyber Resilience Act are increasing the pressure on manufacturers of connected products and machines to integrate cybersecurity considerations throughout the product lifecycle. Regulations on the resilience of critical infrastructure are also heightening the focus on resilience against disruptions, sabotage and cyber-attacks. As a result, OT security is becoming more important not only from a risk and operational perspective, but also, from a regulatory standpoint, as an issue for senior management, risk management and compliance.

How adesso supports you on the path to secure production

If you are considering securing your production against cyber risks, assessing the OT security of your existing plant infrastructure, or developing a robust roadmap for secure production, please do not hesitate to contact us – whether you are just starting out or have already identified specific areas for action.

Our approach combines OT security requirements with the realities of production: high availability, long plant lifecycles, heterogeneous systems, manufacturer dependencies and existing IT/OT interfaces are taken into account right from the start.